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The Earth Belongs to the Living, or at Least It Should: The
Troubling Difficulty of Modifying Antitrust Consent Decrees*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, the public performance of music has been a
powerful force in culture and entertainment. Those providing services
to the public, such as bars and restaurants, began to play music for
customers. However, unauthorized performance of compositions in
public places became a considerable problem for composers, as they
would not receive compensation in exchange for the public use of
their work.1 Eventually, it became evident that it was impractical for
composers to negotiate licenses with individual music users on an ad
hoc basis.2
In the early twentieth century, a group of composers and
musicians responded to this problem by creating performance rights
organizations (“PROs”), including the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (“BMI”). These PROs would handle the administrative
rigors of licensing and, in the process, ensure composers received the
royalties owed to them.3
In essence, PROs are performance rights licensing collectives
that license public performance rights for songs on behalf of the
owners of those songs.4 PROs license songs to music users, such as
bars, restaurants, and coffee shops, that play those songs for their
patrons.5 Further, PROs license public performance rights on behalf
of their members or affiliates, which include songwriters, producers,
performers, or anyone else who has an ownership interest in the
rights to a given song and permits a PRO to license it.6 Thus, PROs
act as important middlemen between artists and music—it would be
* © 2019 Paul H. Sukenik.
1. See Mary Katherine Kennedy, Recent Development, Blanket Licensing of Music
Performing Rights: Possible Solutions to the Copyright-Antitrust Conflict, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 183, 186 (1984); see also Danielle Ely, A Law Student’s Perspective: Don’t Believe Me
Just Watch: A 100% Licensing System Would Stifle Collaboration and Creativity Among
Songwriters, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2016, at 48, 48.
2. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 186.
3. See id. at 184.
4. See Kristelia A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 183, 193 (2016).
5. See id.
6. See id.
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logistically untenable for artists and songwriters to license their songs
to thousands of bars and restaurants on an individual basis and collect
and distribute royalties on those songs.7 Today, PROs account for
over $2 billion in annual U.S. revenue.8
Since 1940, BMI and ASCAP have controlled the performance
rights licensing market by a wide margin as the two largest PROs in
terms of repertoire.9 Today, there are only four prominent PROs in
the United States: BMI, ASCAP, the Society of European Stage
Authors and Composers (“SESAC”), and Global Music Rights
(“GMR”).10 ASCAP and BMI, however, remain the preeminent
players in the industry, controlling about ninety percent of the
performance rights licensing market.11 This near-complete
domination of the market by two PROs has led to concerns of
anticompetitive behavior over the past seventy-five years, and, as a
result, BMI and ASCAP have defended themselves in antitrust
litigation.12
Antitrust concerns in the public performance licensing space
focus on market domination by only two PROs because of the fear
that this could lead to a monopoly.13 In addition, the U.S. Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) has attacked some specific ways that PROs issue
licenses, arguing that the practices are an illegal restraint on trade and
that “the pooling of compositions . . . [has] permitted the performing
rights organizations to charge arbitrary prices.”14 Since only two
PROs are dominant in the industry, the government has been
concerned for years about the potential for parallel pricing and tacit
collusion to remove meaningful competition from the marketplace.15
In response to these antitrust concerns, the DOJ has sought to
regulate PROs over the years through consent decrees that “prevent
7. See id. at 187.
8. Steven J. Gagliano, Comment, Consent Decrees in the Streaming Era: Digital
Withdrawal, Fractional Licensing, and § 114(I), 10 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 317,
322 (2017).
9. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 188 (“ASCAP and BMI, through their members,
control the performance rights to virtually every domestic copyrighted composition.”);
Carly Olson, Comment, Changing Tides in Music Licensing? BMI v. DMX and In Re
THP, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 277, 279 (2012) (stating that BMI and ASCAP
“have come to dominate the field of music licensing”).
10. See Gabriella A. Conte, Note, “Waiting on the (Music) World to Change”:
Licensing in the Digital Age of Music, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 323, 326 (2017).
11. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 330.
12. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 188−89.
13. See id. at 189.
14. Id.
15. See García, supra note 4, at 188.
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‘the aggregation of public performance rights in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act.’”16 The government is able to exercise a measure
of control over PROs by including ground rules and restrictions for
PROs in the terms of each consent decree.17 The terms of these
consent decrees are legally binding against PROs and, in essence,
serve as governmental regulations on the performance rights licensing
industry.18
In recent years, there has been controversy surrounding the
antitrust consent decree between the DOJ and BMI, which the two
first entered into in 1966 and most recently amended in 1994.19
During the lifetime of this decree, the circumstances surrounding the
performance rights licensing industry have changed drastically due to
advances in technology—most notably, the streaming technology
surrounding digital music.20
16. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 320 (quoting DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THE CLOSING OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S
REVIEW OF THE ASCAP & BMI CONSENT DECREES 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/
atr/file/882101/download [https://perma.cc/N8ZW-PWQF]).
17. See Robert R. Zitko, The Appealability of Conditional Consent Judgments, 1994
U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 241 (“A consent judgment is a valuable procedural tool which not
only allows parties to achieve settlement, but also allows courts to retain jurisdiction over
parties to enforce underlying settlement agreements.”); David S. Konczal, Note, Ruing
Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for Modifying Antitrust Consent Decrees and an
Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130, 130−31 (1996) (“Consent decrees are extremely
attractive to both the Antitrust Division and defendants, primarily because of the
avoidance of time consuming and expensive litigation.”). See generally Charles F. Phillips,
Jr., The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39 (1961)
(discussing the role of consent decrees in antitrust enforcement).
18. “A consent decree is a negotiated settlement of a case brought in equity that is
enforced through the court’s [inherent] power to enforce [its own] equitable decrees or
orders.” David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform
Litigation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Second Circuit’s
Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1239 n.5 (1993). An antitrust consent decree also
has been defined as “an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the Attorney
General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct challenged by the Attorney
General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or related
statutes.” ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., REP. ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IX
(Comm. Print 1959).
19. See generally United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017)
(discussing the BMI consent decree). For a detailed recapitulation of the dispute between
the DOJ and BMI/ASCAP and the major points of contention, see García, supra note 4, at
195−96.
20. See Conte, supra note 10, at 325 (“A major issue with the current regulation of
music licensing is the failure to account for today’s commanding digital music presence.
Music in digital form, such as online radio, paid streaming subscription services, and
downloadable song purchases has been on the rise since 2003. Yet, the instruments
governing music licensing have not been updated in decades.”); Gagliano, supra note 8, at
318−19.
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Digital streaming technology has completely changed the way
that performance rights licensing operates. In fact, the disruption has
been so significant with respect to the ability of songwriters and artists
to collect royalties that there has been a bipartisan effort in Congress
over the past few years to address their concerns.21 Those years of
advocacy culminated on October 11, 2018, when President Trump
signed the Music Modernization Act (“MMA”) into law.22 The MMA
“is designed to streamline the music licensing process to make it
easier for rights holders to get paid when their music is streamed
online.”23 The most significant change made by the MMA was the
creation of a new governing agency that “would issue blanket
mechanical licenses to digital services, and collect and distribute
royalties to rights holders.”24 The effect of this measure would be to
ensure that artists, songwriters, and other rights holders are paid on
time and what they are owed.25 Assuming it functions as intended, the
MMA represents a huge victory for rights holders like artists and
songwriters.
In regard to consent decrees between the DOJ and PROs like
BMI, the MMA changed the way judges are assigned to hear
performance-royalty rate proceedings by making the assignments
random.26 The MMA, however, did not override most aspects of the
consent decree between the DOJ and BMI.27 In changing the way
judges are selected to oversee proceedings relating to a consent
decree, the MMA seems to be adjusting the way disputes will be
adjudicated between the parties to the consent decree but not
addressing many of the underlying causes of controversy. The MMA
will hopefully make the process of royalty collection smoother for
rights holders, but many of the disputes that exist between the PROs
and the DOJ relating to their consent decrees are still in play.
21. Dani Deahl, The Music Modernization Act Has Been Signed into Law, VERGE
(Oct. 11, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/11/17963804/musicmodernization-act-mma-copyright-law-bill-labels-congress [https://perma.cc/T6BX-SUX4].
22. See Orrin G. Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17, 19, and 28 U.S.C.).
23. Micah Singleton, Congress May Actually Fix Music Royalties: The Music
Modernization Act, VERGE (Jan. 26, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/
26/16931966/congress-music-modernization-act-licensing-royalties [https://perma.cc/Q9FL8NEW].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Rachel Kim, 6 Things To Know About the Music Modernization Act, S. 2823,
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE (May 10, 2018), https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_post/6-things-toknow-about-the-music-modernization-act-s2823/ [https://perma.cc/3AVK-ZV9W].
27. Id.
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Therefore, the discussion of consent decree modification in this area
remains relevant.
At the time of the consent decree’s creation in 1966, or even at
the time of its amendment in 1994, the DOJ could not have
envisioned the development of digital technologies, such as Spotify,
Pandora, and Apple Music. Such significant changes in technology
have raised questions over the propriety of allowing an industry to be
regulated by an antitrust consent decree that was created at a time
when the industry it regulates was almost unrecognizable.28
Based on these concerns, BMI sought to modify the consent
decree in 2014 but was blocked by the DOJ.29 Instead, the DOJ
sought to reinterpret the consent decree in 2016 to change the way
performance rights licensing operates by requiring the adoption of
“full-work” licensing in place of the traditional practice of
“fractional” licensing.30 If such a change were to be implemented, it
would represent a seismic shift in the performance rights licensing
industry that would lead to severe administrative, financial, and
creative impacts for PROs and songwriters.31 After the DOJ
announced its reinterpretation, BMI sought a declaratory judgment in
federal district court that the consent decree does not require fullwork licensing.32 The district court held in United States v. Broadcast

28. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 318 (“While the music business is no stranger to
disruptive innovation (e.g., Napster), for the first time in decades judicial action seems to
be the culprit of the disruption rather than the commercial innovation itself. The
commercial innovation in question: music streaming; the judicial (in)action: failure to
update consent decrees.”); Konczal, supra note 17, at 132 (“A defendant often requests a
modification because of technological innovations, industrial changes, or increases in
competition since the entry of the decree that have made compliance with the decree too
burdensome and restrictive. The Antitrust Division often requests a modification because
of a change in circumstances in the industry or business affected by the decree to the
extent that the decree no longer serves the purposes of the antitrust laws.”).
29. See ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, FUTURE MUSIC COALITION (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/ascap-bmi-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/
YJ6Y-NP8Z].
30. See Conte, supra note 10, at 324 (“Drawing from this default position of copyright
law, it follows that when one of multiple copyright owners of a single musical composition
wants to permit a music user to play that composition publicly, that owner alone may give
license. This process is known as full-work licensing.”); see also David J. Kappos, The
Antitrust Assault on Intellectual Property, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 665, 683 (2018)
(“Ignoring this longstanding consensus, in 2016 the DOJ began contending that a PRO
should be able to license only works to which it can offer a complete license, in other
words, works created entirely by parties who are members of that PRO.”).
31. See Conte, supra note 10, at 334. For additional discussion of the implications of
shifting from fractional licensing to full-work licensing, see infra Part IV.
32. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Music, Inc.,33 and the Second Circuit later affirmed, that the consent
decree requires neither fractional nor full-work licensing, so either
form of licensing would be permissible.34 As a result, there was no
clear resolution to the dispute over licensing practices. Although the
DOJ “lost” in Broadcast Music, Inc. and BMI “won,” the practical
consequence of the ordeal is that the outdated terms of the consent
decree still remain the same almost five years after BMI requested a
modification. From a normative standpoint, it seems problematic that
major players in a rapidly changing industry have been requesting
modification for almost five years without any success.
When viewed through that prism, everyone loses. When external
forces demand changes in terms that cannot be effectuated, the
industry as a whole becomes less efficient. If the performance rights
licensing industry is not operating at an optimal level because it is
governed by outdated consent decrees, then there are harmful
consequences to PROs, songwriters, publishers, bar and restaurant
owners, the DOJ, other music consumers, and the economy as a
whole due to persistent inefficiencies that could be avoided by
modifying the terms of the consent decree. As Thomas Jefferson once
wrote in a letter to James Madison, “[T]he earth belongs in usufruct
to the living,”35 and that sentiment still rings true several hundred
years later. Intuitively, it does not make sense for the performance
rights licensing industry—or any other industry for that matter—to be
governed by terms that were created in a previous generation. In
some ways, Jefferson’s statement rings even more true today in a
world in which technologies like music streaming are advancing at a
pace that has never been seen before. This Recent Development
argues that the current precedent governing modification of consent
decrees, which is characterized by inflexibility, is suboptimal for
society because it hinders the timely adoption of important changes to
consent decrees that are necessary for industries to keep pace with
emerging technologies like music streaming. In response, the legal
process of consent decree modification should be relaxed through the
adoption of a new totality-of-the-circumstances test.

33. 207 F. Supp. 3d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017).
34. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2017).
35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds.,
1958) (“The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems
never to have been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a question of
such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental
principles of every government.”).
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This Recent Development proceeds in five parts. Part I explores
the historical background of consent decrees and their role in
antitrust regulation of the performance rights licensing industry. Part
II examines the facts and holding of Broadcast Music, Inc. Part III
surveys the current law with respect to modification and asserts that
consent decrees should be modified, not reinterpreted. Part IV
illustrates why it is crucial for the terms of the BMI consent decree to
be changed by exploring the desired modifications of involved parties
in response to the ever-changing technological climate. Finally, Part V
proposes that courts adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances test for
assessing modification requests in order to make it easier to modify
consent decrees while still maintaining necessary safeguards against
ill-advised or unfair changes. Adopting the new totality-of-thecircumstances test would make consent decree modifications more
attainable and would thereby enable performance rights licensing and
other industries to adapt to changes in technology and society in a
more timely manner.
I. ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES AND THEIR ROLE IN MUSIC
LICENSING
Since the early 1940s, consent decrees have played a powerful
role in the regulation of performance rights licensing by PROs such as
BMI and ASCAP.36 As a result, music publishers and PROs have had
a disproportionate amount of power in the industry for over seven
decades.37 For instance, ASCAP controlled “the great bulk of music
in commercial demand” during the first half of the twentieth century,
which led to widespread fears that it could hold monopolistic power
over performance rights licensing.38 In 1939, BMI was created as an
alternative to ASCAP in an effort to break up ASCAP’s monopoly.39
The introduction of BMI, however, did not immediately solve the
problem and, in 1941, the DOJ took action to curb perceived antitrust
abuses by suing ASCAP for antitrust violations and market abuse.40
The parties settled the lawsuit via a consent decree and, shortly
thereafter, BMI also entered into a consent decree with the DOJ with
nearly identical terms.41 These settlements set the precedent for using
36. See ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29.
37. See id.
38. Comment, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable
Compromise, 1959 DUKE L.J. 258, 260.
39. See Conte, supra note 10, at 336.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 334.
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consent decrees as a tool for antitrust regulation in performance
rights licensing.
Essentially, a consent decree is a contract between parties in
litigation. The court enters the decree as a judgment in order to settle
a lawsuit on terms that are, in theory, mutually acceptable to all
litigants.42 In the context of performance rights licensing, consent
decrees are used for antitrust regulation and occur between the DOJ
and a corporate defendant.43 Antitrust consent decrees have also been
used by the DOJ in the context of cellular communication.44
A consent decree in the antitrust context is an agreement
between the government and a defendant that settles a pending
antitrust action that has typically been brought by the DOJ.45 By
entering into a consent decree, the defendant “accepts specific
limitations on his future conduct, and the Government indicates its
willingness to terminate the suit on those terms.”46 A consent decree
entered by a district does not constitute an adjudication on the
merits.47 As a result, the government exercises a measure of control
over the defendant because the defendant must, moving forward,
abide by the terms set by the government in the consent decree.48 The
use of consent decrees to settle cases has benefits for both sides, not
the least of which is the avoidance of lengthy and costly litigation.49
In addition, consent decrees are used as a regulatory tool in a
number of other contexts. For instance, the Environmental Protection
Agency has used consent decrees to mandate guidelines for entities
involved in the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.50 Consent decrees
have also been used in the context of employment and civil rights
issues, such as use by a court to settle a civil rights lawsuit brought by
an Alabama man alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.51

42. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 40.
43. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 188−89.
44. See Bernard T. Shen, Comment, From Jail Cell to Cellular Communication:
Should the Rufo Standard Be Applied to Antitrust and Commercial Consent Decrees?, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 1781, 1782−83 (1996).
45. See Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1303, 1303 (1967).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 1304−05.
50. See John R. Thomas, Note, United States v. Fisher: “Posner’s Dilemma” and the
Uncertain Triumph of Outcome over Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 427, 427 (1991).
51. Michael T. Larkin, Casenotes, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1063, 1064 (1990).
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Moreover, consent decrees have been used in lawsuits by
prisoners complaining of inhumane conditions inside prisons.52 For
example, before a lawsuit between the inmates and administrators of
a prison in the U.S. Virgin Islands reached trial, it was settled via a
consent decree that represented a compromise between the prison
and the inmates.53 The resulting consent decree did not close the
facility as the inmates requested, but it did contain a number of new
regulations that were favorable to the inmates.54 For instance, it
required the prison to reduce the inmate population to ninety-seven
and improve the prison’s shelter, health care, and fire safety.55
A. The Function of Consent Decrees in Antitrust Regulation
One of the main objectives behind the consent decree regime in
antitrust regulation is efficiency. Consent decrees eliminate the time
and expense involved in preparing for and fully litigating a dispute.56
In order to capture this efficiency, the parties generally agree upon
consent decrees at a relatively early stage in the litigation.57 Consent
decrees tend to reflect a degree of compromise because the
agreements usually emerge from a series of secret, informal
negotiations between counsel from the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and
the defendant’s lawyers.58
Under the current regime, parties also benefit from using consent
decrees to find common ground in disputes. Rather than allowing the
litigation to continue as a zero-sum game in which one party will win
and the other party will lose, consent decrees allow parties to come
together and broker the most efficient, fair, and sustainable solution
possible.

52. See, e.g., Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. V.I. 1997); see also Deborah
Decker, Comment, Consent Decrees and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Usurping Judicial Power or Quelling Judicial Micro-Management?, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
1275, 1276−78 (“In June 1994, a group of pretrial detainees and inmates at the Criminal
Justice Complex in St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands, brought a class action
requesting that the complex be closed because of extreme overcrowding and related
health concerns.”).
53. See Carty, 957 F. Supp. at 732; see also Decker, supra note 52, at 1278.
54. See Carty, 957 F. Supp. at 732–33; see also Decker, supra note 52, at 1278.
55. See Carty, 957 F. Supp. at 732–33, 732 n.4; see also Decker, supra note 52, at 1278
(requiring that “the inmate population [be reduced] to ninety-seven and requir[ing] the
defendants to make improvements in a number of areas, including shelter, mental health
care, medical care, fire safety, and security”).
56. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 40.
57. Id.
58. See id.
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Consent decrees play an important role in antitrust regulation
because their terms serve as rules for how defendant-corporations
may behave in the future and gives the DOJ recourse if the
corporations violate those rules. For instance, the ASCAP and BMI
consent decrees created a separate Rate Court for ASCAP and BMI,
which is used to adjudicate disputes between a PRO and a music user
to determine reasonable license fees.59 This independent decisionmaking body serves to protect consumer interests because it
safeguards against ASCAP and BMI using their near monopoly in the
market to charge exorbitant prices.60 Additionally, the ASCAP and
BMI consent decrees regulate the two dominant PROs by stipulating
that agreements between composers and ASCAP or BMI are
nonexclusive, meaning that composers remain free to directly license
their works to a music user outside the PRO structure even if the
composers are already members of ASCAP or BMI.61 This term of
the consent decree limits the power and influence of ASCAP and
BMI while fostering expansion in the marketplace by keeping the
door open for smaller competitors to enter the fray.
As a practical matter, the defendant in litigation against the
DOJ, which is typically a corporation or other institution, has the
burden of initiating negotiations and preparing a first draft of the
consent decree.62 After the defendant has submitted a draft proposal
for the terms of the consent decree, lawyers on both sides begin secret
negotiations in pursuit of a final agreement that is acceptable to all
parties.63
After negotiations finish, a court must accept and sign the
proposed consent decree.64 Court approval, however, is typically little
more than a formality and is generally regarded as a routine matter.65
The court is not required to make any findings of fact or conclusions
of law in approving a consent decree.66 Rather, counsel for each party
gives a short presentation and, if the court is satisfied that the parties

59. See Todd Brabec, The Performance Right—A World in Transition, 42 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 16, 18−19 (2016).
60. Id. at 20–21.
61. See id. at 22.
62. See Phillips, supra note 17, at 40.
63. See id. at 41.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. United States v. Inst. of Carpet Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 1 F.R.D. 636, 638 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
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are in agreement, it enters the consent decree with only a cursory
review.67
B.

The Importance of Consent Decree Changes for PROs: The
Collection of Royalties

The antitrust consent decree at issue in Broadcast Music, Inc.
represents a voluntary agreement between BMI and the U.S.
government containing the rules under which BMI must conduct its
business.68 Among other things, the consent decree “[g]overns BMI’s
obligations to its license customers; [s]ets the rules for BMI’s
relationships with its songwriters, [c]omposers and publishers; and
[c]reates a ‘rate court’ where BMI and its customers can resolve
disputes regarding the rates and terms of their license agreement.”69
The consent decree was intended to promote competition in the
marketplace for musical works by encouraging ASCAP and BMI to
compete with one another to attract licensees and recruit new
songwriter- and publisher-members.70 The BMI consent decree has
become controversial because most of its terms were drafted in 1966
at a time when technologies relating to the distribution and sharing of
music were essentially unrecognizable. BMI now believes that “[t]he
decree is simply not built to address the specific challenges and
opportunities of the current music rights marketplace.”71
The proposed changes to BMI’s consent decree are important on
a day-to-day basis because they govern the collection of royalties.72
Traditionally, PROs operate as agents for composers and songwriters
who own the copyrights to their songs but are not well versed in
licensing. PROs serve as middlemen and help composers license the
performance rights to their songs to music users who want to perform
those songs without violating copyright law.73 First, a publisher signs a

67. Phillips, supra note 17, at 41.
68. For an overview of the history of the consent decree between the DOJ and BMI,
see Gagliano, supra note 8, at 323−29; Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its Jail Cell:
The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 662 (1997) (“Over the past thirty years, antitrust enforcement
agencies have fervently embraced the consent decree as a tonic for much of what ails a
competitive marketplace.”).
69. What Is the Consent Decree?, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., https://www.bmi.com/
pdfs/advocacy/about_bmi_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/95QK-P7UZ].
70. ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29.
71. What Is the Consent Decree?, supra note 69.
72. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 319.
73. See Brabec, supra note 59, at 17−18.
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contract with a PRO.74 Then, the PRO issues licenses to music users
who, in turn, receive the right to play or perform all of the songs
controlled by all of the songwriters.75 In effect, the PROs create
efficiency by pooling copyrights and issuing collective licenses to
music users and then paying their affiliated member-publishers prorated shares of the net income.76
C.

The Problem of Fractional Licensing

The traditional industry practice is fractional licensing of jointly
owned songs.77 This fractional-licensing regime took hold out of
necessity in America during the twentieth century based on the
administrative infeasibility of monitoring every single live
performance of every song.78 Essentially, fractional licensing occurs
when a PRO licenses only the share of a co-owned work that is owned
by the composer who is a member of the PRO.79 Many, if not most,
songs are co-owned by multiple individuals, such as a composer, a
lyricist, and a producer. Under a fractional-licensing regime, each coowner of a song can only license, whether directly or through a PRO,
his proportional interest in the co-owned song to other music users.80
Thus, it follows that if the co-owners of a song belong to different
PROs, each PRO may only license the fraction of the work that
belongs to the co-owner who is a member of that PRO.81 To ensure
they are covered under this fractional-licensing system, music users
like performance venues generally purchase licenses from all four of
the major PROs because all co-owners will almost certainly be a
member of one of the prominent PROs.82

74. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS
242 (Simon & Schuster, 9th ed. 2015).
75. Id.
76. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 319−20.
77. Letter from Stuart Rosen, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, BMI, to Chief
of the Litig. Section of the Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 20, 2015)
[hereinafter Rosen Letter], https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi38. pdf
[https://perma.cc/RX24-9FGA] (providing signatures from members of the music industry
in regard to the “Justice Department Review of the BMI and ASCAP Consent Decrees”
and voicing concerns in opposition to the DOJ’s proposed reinterpretation).
78. See Music Licensing History, NAT’L RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING MUSIC LICENSE
COMMITTEE, http://www.nrbmlc.com/music-licensing/music-licensing-history/ [https://perma.cc/
HYW7-CHEX].
79. See Kappos, supra note 30, at 682.
80. See id. at 683.
81. See id.
82. See id.; see also Ely, supra note 1, at 49 (“Under the current system, if a business
or organization wishes to publicly perform music, it must obtain licenses from ASCAP,
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For example, suppose A and B are co-owners of a song, with
each of them owning 50% of the copyright per an agreement between
them. If A is a member of ASCAP, then ASCAP will issue licenses to
music users like restaurants and then pay A royalties in the amount of
his fractional share, which is 50% in this case. Likewise, if B is a
member of BMI, then BMI will issue licenses to music users and then
pay B royalties in the amount of his 50% fractional share. If a music
user has purchased licenses from both ASCAP and BMI, then it
operates under the assumption that it may legally play 100% of the
work rather than worrying about fractional shares of co-owners. If a
music user has purchased licenses from both ASCAP and BMI, then
it does not have to worry about liability relating to unauthorized
performance of the work.
As a result, the fractional-licensing regime simplifies the
administration of performance rights licensing by not forcing all
involved parties to keep careful track of precise percentages in coownership agreements. As a technical matter, the PROs only have the
right to license the percentage of a composition owned by their
affiliates. As a practical matter, however, they can license the entire
song because the presence of only four main PROs allows music users
to cover their bases fairly easily by simply purchasing a license from
all four. This ambiguity that music users face in determining whether
they have properly licensed an entire song, in part, led to the DOJ’s
challenge of the fractional-licensing regime, despite its long-running
position as the default industry practice.83
The fractional-licensing system also becomes complicated in the
context of royalties, as PROs only collect royalties for their own
affiliates and in proportion to their ownership interests in the songs.84
If a song is co-owned by multiple owners who work with different
PROs, then each PRO has to independently collect royalties and pay
them out to members based on the proportion of the song owned by
the member.85
Despite the prevalence of multiple co-owners having fractional
ownership interests and often working with different PROs, music
users can assume they are properly licensed to perform any song, as
long as they have licenses with the four main PROs.86 In this way,
BMI, or SESAC; or it could also buy licenses from a combination of two or all three of
these performance rights organizations.”).
83. See Ely, supra note 1, at 49.
84. See id. at 50.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 49.
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fractional licensing creates antitrust concerns due to the potential for
stifling competition by crowding the market. It is feasible for a bar or
restaurant to purchase licenses with only four PROs, which is all that
is needed to be in compliance under the current fractional-licensing
regime. On the other hand, it would not be feasible for every bar and
restaurant to purchase licenses from dozens of PROs in order to
avoid liability, which might be necessary in a more competitive
market under a fractional-licensing regime.
As such, it would be extremely difficult for competitor PROs to
break into the market under a fractional-licensing scheme because
music users do not want to be required to purchase more licenses in
order to be in compliance. Therefore, the fractional-licensing system
reinforces the dominance of only four PROs in the market because it
would be difficult for competitors to even enter the market. If the
long-standing practice of fractional licensing seems a bit unclear, that
is because it is unclear.87
D. The Push for Full-Work Licensing
In recent years, the DOJ has targeted fractional licensing, at least
in part because of the ambiguities surrounding co-ownership interests
and has sought to replace it by reinterpreting performance rights
licensing consent decrees to require a full-work licensing regime as it
did in Broadcast Music, Inc.88 A full-work licensing system would be
entirely different from the current fractional-licensing regime. Such a
massive shift would force the industry to completely change how it
transacts business in many ways.89 Under a full-work licensing regime,
PROs would have “to grant a complete 100% license for any song
they administer, even if only a portion.”90 The administrability of this
system grows murky in the context of royalties because BMI would
have to grant a 100% license to music users even if its member only
owned 50% of the song and his co-owner owned the other 50% but
was affiliated with ASCAP.91
In effect, the PRO would have to grant 100% of the license and
then pay applicable royalties to both its member and the member of
87. See id. (“[T]he exact mechanics of what songs (or portions of songs) each of these
licenses cover seem to be unclear.”).
88. See id. (“The ambiguous nature of these licenses is evidenced by the questions
posed by the Department of Justice.”).
89. See id. at 50 (“This new regime would be completely at odds with the current
music licensing system, and would undermine decades of established and efficient
practices.”).
90. Id.
91. See id.
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another PRO in proportion to their co-ownership interests. That
would be a significant change because, under the current fractionallicensing regime, “PROs account only to their own affiliates.”92 Under
a full-work licensing regime, PROs would have to implement a system
to track nonaffiliate composers in order to pay them the royalties they
are owed.93 Gathering all of that information about nonmembers
would be costly and complicated and would result in higher
transaction costs for both affiliates of PROs and music users.94
Such a radical departure from the traditional practice of
fractional licensing would turn the industry on its head by forcing all
interested parties to revisit and reformulate decades of established
practices that have grown out of practical experience in the field.95 In
many ways, parties involved in licensing would have to start over with
regard to their licensing practices and would lose the efficiencies and
institutional knowledge they have developed over the past century.
Unsurprisingly, there was significant backlash against the DOJ’s
reinterpretation, and it was challenged by BMI in federal court.96
II. FACTS OF BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. AND THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S
OPINION
Due to the advent of streaming technologies, in 2014 BMI
petitioned the DOJ to modify the consent decree “to permit
publishers to directly negotiate streaming rights with digital services
providers like Spotify and Pandora.”97 The DOJ opened a review of
BMI’s consent decree in response.98 On August 4, 2016, the DOJ
announced that it would not modify the consent decree but instead
would reinterpret the decree to include a 100% full-work licensing
requirement.99 The DOJ, in issuing this reinterpretation, turned the
traditional model of fractional licensing on its head. The DOJ’s new
requirement of full-work licensing would mean that BMI must
“license 100% of a song for use, regardless of what percentage of the

92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017) (striking down the DOJ’s reinterpretation of the
consent decree that would have required full-work licensing instead of fractional
licensing).
97. Gagliano, supra note 8, at 321.
98. See id.
99. ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29.
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song [BMI] represents.”100 Therefore, “any entity that controls part of
a composition must offer a license for the whole of the
composition.”101 The DOJ based its decision not only on textual
interpretations of the consent decree but also on the policy reason
that “only full-work licensing can yield the substantial procompetitive
benefits associated with blanket licenses.”102
This reinterpretation would have been significant because, as
described above, the performance rights licensing industry has
traditionally operated under a fractional-licensing regime “whereby
each owner holds a copyright to a portion of the song, and all must
grant license[s] to a music user in order to secure the rights to a public
performance.”103
In an effort to preserve the status quo of fractional licensing and
avoid upsetting the apple cart for the entire performance rights
licensing industry, BMI promptly challenged the DOJ’s decision in
district court and won.104 In striking down the DOJ’s reinterpretation
of the consent decree, Judge Louis L. Stanton wrote that “[t]he
Consent Decree neither bars fractional licensing, nor requires fullwork licensing.”105 The DOJ appealed the district court’s ruling to the
Second Circuit.106
In United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc.,107 the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court and rejected the DOJ’s proposed
reinterpretation that would have required full-work licensing.108 The
Second Circuit held that, in asking for its proposed reinterpretation,
the DOJ was in effect asking the court to read an additional
requirement into the consent decree in order to accomplish
procompetitive objectives.109 The court concluded that it would be
100. Brittany Hodak, U.S. Dept. of Justice Deals Crushing Blow to Songwriters,
FORBES (July 1, 2016, 1:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brittanyhodak/2016/07/01/u-sdept-of-justice-deals-crushing-blow-to-songwriters/#e96550113faa [https://perma.cc/2DCMMC4N].
101. ASCAP – BMI Consent Decrees, supra note 29.
102. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON THE
CLOSING OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S REVIEW OF THE ASCAP & BMI CONSENT
DECREES 3 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/882101/download [https://perma.cc/N8ZWPWQF].
103. Conte, supra note 10, at 324.
104. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
aff’d, 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017).
105. See id. at 377.
106. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14, 14 (2d Cir. 2017).
107. 720 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017).
108. Id. at 18.
109. See id. (“To the extent DOJ asks us [to] read an additional requirement into the
decree to advance these procompetitive objectives, we are foreclosed from doing so.”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 734 (2019)

750

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

improper to consider the potential competitive impact of the
proposed reinterpretation and thus rejected the reinterpretation
because it was not supported by the terms contained within the four
corners of the consent decree.110 In doing so, the Second Circuit
squashed the DOJ’s attempt to make a significant material change to
the operation of the consent decree through reinterpretation rather
than an actual modification of the terms.
In a technical sense, the Second Circuit appropriately applied
existing precedent governing the interpretation of consent decrees.
Over the years, there have been a number of decisions in which courts
commented on the process of interpreting consent decrees. In Perez
v. Danbury Hospital,111 the Second Circuit stated that it is a “wellestablished principle that the language of a consent decree must
dictate what a party is required to do and what it must refrain from
doing” and that “courts must abide by the express terms of a consent
decree and may not impose [additional requirements or]
supplementary obligations on the parties even to fulfill the purposes
of the decree more effectively.”112 In addition, in United States v.
Armour & Co.113 the Supreme Court stated that “the scope of a
consent decree must be discerned within its four corners.”114 The
Court may not “impose obligations on a party that are not
unambiguously mandated by the decree itself.”115 These rigid
principles limit the ability of courts to approve any reinterpretation
beyond the express terms of a consent decree.
On a textual basis, the court in Broadcast Music, Inc. properly
adhered to precedent because the text of the consent decree is silent
on the issue of fractional versus full-work licensing,116 and precedent
precludes the court from imposing any requirements upon parties not
expressly included in the terms of the consent decree.117 In its
argument, the DOJ claimed that a full-work licensing arrangement
110. See id.
111. 347 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2003).
112. Id. at 424 (first citing United States v. O’Rourke, 943 F.2d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1991);
then citing King v. Allied Vision Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); and then citing
United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, 998 F.2d 1101, 1107 (2d Cir. 1992)).
113. 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
114. Id. at 682.
115. Barcia v. Sitkin, 367 F.3d 87, 106 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Tourangeau v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 101 F.3d 300, 307 (2d Cir. 1996)).
116. See Consent Decree at 5–6, United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64-Civ-3787
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/489866/download
[https://perma.cc/GJV6-TWUK] (providing the most recent version of the BMI consent
decree).
117. See Perez, 347 F.3d at 424.
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would have “procompetitive benefits.”118 However, the court did not
take a deep look at the policy reasons behind the proposed
reinterpretation because Perez stated that it could not impose
additional requirements that were not already included in the text of
the consent decree, even when they might “fulfill the purposes of the
decree more effectively.”119 In that sense, Perez stands for the
proposition that courts cannot interpret consent decrees based on
policy reasons without an explicit basis in the text of the agreement.
Decisions relating to reinterpretation and modification of
antitrust consent decrees are high stakes, and any such changes have
the potential to cause reverberations throughout the entire
industry.120 Following the court’s decision in Broadcast Music, Inc.,
the MIC Coalition (“MIC”)—a group of trade associations that
represent radio stations and other music users—released a statement
saying the decision “will have devastating consequences for the future
of music licensing. If left unchallenged, this decision will
fundamentally alter decades of business practices while destroying the
value of collective licensing and threatening to throw the entire music
marketplace into chaos.”121 The dramatic prose and “sky-is-falling”
tone of MIC’s statement shows how crucial the terms of these consent
decrees are to parties with material interests in the performance
rights licensing industry.
Although the DOJ “lost” in Broadcast Music, Inc. and BMI
“won,” the practical consequence of the litigation is that the outdated
terms of the consent decree still remain the same almost five years
after BMI requested a modification. After the initial modification
request, the DOJ was able to reject the request and instead announce
its own unilateral reinterpretation that would have the practical effect
of a modification.122 Under the current system, BMI’s only recourse
against the DOJ’s reinterpretation was to challenge it in federal
district court. Then, once the district court rejected the
reinterpretation, the dispute entered the lengthy appeals process.123
118. See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 720 F. App’x 14, 17−18 (2d Cir. 2017).
119. Perez, 347 F.3d at 424.
120. See Conte, supra note 10, at 328−34. For more discussion on potential industrywide impacts, see infra Part IV.
121. Press Release, MIC Coal., MIC Coalition Statement on Court of Appeals
Decision on BMI Consent Decrees (Dec. 20, 2017), https://mic-coalition.org/news-posts/
mic-coalition-statement-bmi-consent-decrees/ [https://perma.cc/XWZ7-T9CT].
122. See Kappos, supra note 30, at 683.
123. See id. at 684 (“The DOJ’s radical reinterpretation was flatly rejected by the
Southern District of New York in 2016 . . . [and] the DOJ continues to press its position on
appeal.”).
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Given how cumbersome and slow the American courts system
typically is, it is unsurprising that the terms of the BMI consent decree
remain the same. From a normative standpoint, it seems problematic
that major players in a rapidly changing industry have been
requesting modification for almost five years without any success.
The DOJ and other proponents of full-work licensing view
fractional licensing as anticompetitive, forcing music users to
purchase licenses from all four major PROs in order to avoid
liability.124 Implementing a system in which music users are not
required to have licenses with all PROs in order to protect themselves
would allow for competition to enter the market and for the number
of PROs to expand, thus driving down prices. In a fractional-licensing
system in which all music users must purchase licenses with PROs, it
is going to be difficult for new PROs to gain traction because music
users want to purchase as few licenses as possible.
The full-work licensing system would also help music users
ensure they are in compliance with copyright law by relieving the
clerical burden of keeping track of co-ownership interests.125 There is
no central database that keeps track of co-ownership interests in
songs, so it is difficult for music users to ensure compliance with
copyright law because they do not know with certainty who owns or
co-owns compositions and in what proportion.126 In a full-work
licensing regime, music users would have assurance that they can
legally perform specific compositions, as any PRO that owned any
portion of a song would have the authority to grant a full license to
perform the composition.127
In sum, the Second Circuit’s holding was correct as a technical
matter because the court properly adhered to applicable precedent in
its decision. Common sense tells us that outdated consent decrees
need to be updated to keep pace with emerging technologies, but
existing precedent indicates that reinterpretation is not an effective
method for changing consent decrees. Therefore, it is important to
explore other possible avenues for changing consent decrees.

124. See Ely, supra note 1, at 50 (“Under the current system, a licensee that does not
purchase licenses from all three major PROs would have to monitor which musical works
it used and play only works wholly owned by the PRO from which it purchased a
license.”).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. (“Requiring 100% licensing would give greater assurance that a licensee
was granted the necessary permissions to use specific compositions, as any party that
owned any portion of a work could grant a full license to use the work.”).
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III. CHANGING A CONSENT DECREE THROUGH MODIFICATION
RATHER THAN REINTERPRETATION
A. Reinterpretation as a Method for Altering Consent Decrees
While the court’s rejection of the DOJ’s proposed
reinterpretation was correct in a technical sense, the result also seems
proper in a normative sense. The Second Circuit’s rejection of the
DOJ’s reinterpretation of the existing terms is intuitive because it
seems that the DOJ may have been trying to obtain its desired
reforms by using reinterpretation as a back door. It can be termed a
“back door” because the DOJ’s maneuvering sought to materially
change the terms of the consent decree without actually changing the
terms. If the main objective behind consent decrees is to reach
compromise through voluntary negotiations, then it makes sense that
one party should not be able to unilaterally reinterpret the previously
agreed upon terms in a way that materially changes the operation of a
bilaterally created agreement.
Scholars have argued that, if reinterpretation of consent decrees
becomes common, then the incentive to enter into such decrees would
be reduced significantly because they would seem like a thing of wax
in the hands of agencies.128 If agencies could easily change consent
decrees through reinterpretation, then the terms of decrees would
become unpredictable and it would be harder for parties to rely on
them in making organizational decisions.129 Predictability is an
important attribute of consent decrees that should be preserved, as it
is part of what makes consent decrees attractive as a means of dispute
resolution in the first place.130 If consent decrees were to disappear as
a regulatory tool, then litigation would increase significantly and be
costly and burdensome to all parties involved.131
Some might argue that agencies have expertise in the field and
should be able to change the terms of consent decrees in accordance
with that expertise. The dispute surrounding Broadcast Music, Inc.,
however, reveals that material changes to these consent decrees can
have reverberations that echo throughout an entire industry and,

128. See Phillip G. Oldham, Comment, Regulatory Consent Decrees: An Argument for
Deference to Agency Interpretations, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 419 (1995).
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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when aggregated, the economy as a whole.132 In addition, often a
change that is beneficial for one side is harmful for the other. As a
result, one must ask whether, as a normative matter, it is acceptable
for a few experts at an agency to be making decisions that could have
such a profound impact on many different elements of the economy
and society without the participation of the interested parties and the
courts.
In this case, the DOJ wanted to change the system to full-work
licensing in order to achieve procompetitive benefits. Such a change
would result in a massive shift for the performance rights licensing
industry. For the reasons discussed above, unilateral reinterpretation
by one party should not be the manner by which consent decrees
change because reinterpretation of material terms could
fundamentally alter the way an entire industry does business and, in
turn, have a noticeable effect on the overall economy. Although the
actual language of a consent decree would not be changed through
reinterpretation, its operation could be significantly altered, as
evidenced by the Broadcast Music, Inc. dispute. Therefore, the rigid
precedent relating to reinterpretation of consent decrees is tolerable
for society because one party should not be able to change the
operation of the decree.
Having exposed the weaknesses of reinterpretation, another
method is needed to facilitate changes to consent decrees when
necessary in order to keep pace with new technologies. These
antitrust consent decrees do not, as a practical matter, exist in a
vacuum. While the terms of consent decrees remain static over the
years, forces in technology and society are constantly evolving. As
technology advances, the ecosystem in which consent decrees operate
can completely change and render obsolete the ability of the consent
decree to effectively regulate. In terms of the BMI consent decree,
the advent of digital music has essentially ushered in a new epoch of
performance rights licensing. It is troubling, to say the least, that a
consent decree originally drafted in 1966 and last amended in 1994
still governs performance rights licensing in the digital age. Since the
early days of antitrust consent decrees, scholars have shared these
concerns about the ability, or lack thereof, to update consent decrees
in response to changing circumstances in technology and society.133
132. Brian Penick, 5 Things Songwriters Need To Know About the Consent Decree,
SOUNDSTR (July 13, 2016), https://www.soundstr.com/5-things-consent-decree/
[https://perma.cc/EX7C-DVML].
133. Milton Katz, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration, 53 HARV. L. REV.
415, 423 (1940) (claiming that each antitrust consent decree should have “an express
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Case Law Relating to Modification of Consent Decrees

With reinterpretation off the table, modification is another
avenue through which a party may seek to change the terms of a
consent decree. First, the party seeking modification must make a
motion requesting that the court amend an antitrust consent decree.134
In its 1932 opinion in United States v. Swift & Co.,135 the Court stated
that, in order to succeed, the movant must show that new
circumstances have led to a “grievous wrong” that requires a
modification to the agreement.136 Years later, in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,137 the Court added that a request for
modification should only be granted if the movant can show that the
decree’s original purposes have been fulfilled.138 That holding could
apply in the context of the BMI consent decree if hundreds of PROs
suddenly appeared and BMI no longer had a near monopoly on the
licensing of performance rights. The original purpose of the consent
decree between the DOJ and BMI was to limit anticompetitive
behavior and alleviate antitrust concerns in a performance rights
licensing industry that was, at that time, dominated by only a few
PROs.139 If, hypothetically, hundreds of new PROs entered the
performance rights licensing industry and BMI only possessed a two
percent market share, then a court might say that the decree’s original
purpose has been fulfilled and, in turn, would likely be willing to
grant a modification. Swift and United Shoe have together been
construed to form the fairly rigid, traditional standard for modifying
an antitrust consent decree.140
reservation of power in the court to modify or vacate the decree whenever it shall appear
that such modification or revocation is necessary to achieve the purpose of the decree or
to take account of changed conditions; and an express statement that it is contemplated
that either party, upon due notice to the other, may apply to the court for an order
modifying or revoking the decree in accordance with the reservation of power”).
134. See Konczal, supra note 17, at 132 (“The court that initially enters a consent
decree has the power to modify the decree. . . . Despite this inherent power of a court of
equity, most consent decrees contain a retention-of-jurisdiction clause which stipulates
that the court entering the decree can later modify or terminate it at the request of one or
both of the parties.”).
135. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
136. Id. at 119 (“Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed . . . with the consent
of all concerned.”).
137. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
138. See id. at 248 (noting that a request for modification should not be granted where
the “purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree . . . have not been fully
achieved”).
139. See supra notes 9−18 and accompanying text.
140. See Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 625−26.
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However, the precedent set forth by Swift and United Shoe—
both antitrust cases—became murky after the Court relaxed the
standard in the context of institutional reform (notably separate from
the area of antitrust).141 In the institutional reform setting, consent
decrees have been used to regulate institutions by imposing
requirements on their administration. For instance, a consent decree
could force a prison to improve living conditions for inmates by
instituting a strict cap on the number of inmates who could be housed
there, limiting the number of inmates per cell, or requiring that
inmates be given a certain amount of time outdoors each day.
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,142 the Court said the
movant need only show that a “significant change in circumstances
warrants revision of the decree.”143 The Rufo Court held that consent
decrees may be amended “when changed factual conditions make
compliance with the decree substantially more onerous,” “when a
decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles,” or
“when enforcement of the decree without modification would be
detrimental to the public interest.”144 This new standard set forth a
much lower bar for modifying a consent decree than the rigid test set
forth in Swift and United Shoe. As a result, Rufo stands for a more
flexible approach to amending consent decrees. It is unclear,
however, whether the Rufo standard would apply to an antitrust
consent decree as in Broadcast Music, Inc. because Rufo involved an
institutional reform consent decree.145
In 1995, the Second Circuit appeared to extend the more flexible
Rufo standard to the modification of antitrust consent decrees in
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.146 In Kodak, a photographic film
company entered into two separate antitrust consent decrees with the
DOJ in 1921 and 1954 that imposed a variety of restrictions on
Kodak’s business practices.147 In 1993, Kodak brought a motion to
modify or terminate the consent decrees.148 The district court and the
141. See generally Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (adopting
the more flexible Rufo standard for modification requests of consent decrees in the
context of institutional reform).
142. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
143. Id. at 383.
144. Id. at 384.
145. See Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 626 (“Because the consent decree in Rufo
specifically involved institutional reform, lower courts are divided over the extent to which
Rufo’s more flexible standard should apply beyond an institutional reform setting.”).
146. 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995).
147. Id. at 97.
148. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 853 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D.N.Y. 1994),
aff’d, 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Second Circuit first agreed that the Supreme Court’s rulings in United
Shoe and Rufo provided the legal standard for terminating antitrust
consent decrees, and second, under the standards announced in those
decisions, it was proper to terminate or modify the consent decrees.149
Despite the court’s explicit application of Rufo, the court
stopped short of wholesale importation of the Rufo standard into
antitrust consent decree jurisprudence.150 In effect, the Second
Circuit’s apparent adoption of Rufo into the context of antitrust
consent decree modification amounted to nothing more than a Swift
and United Shoe analysis.151 As a result, there is substantial confusion
as to whether the Second Circuit should apply Rufo in the case of an
antitrust consent decree modification.152
Under the somewhat confusing law of modification, BMI has
experienced years of delay in securing potential changes to the decree
that could improve the way the entire industry operates. BMI first
tried to modify the consent decree in 2014 in response to the advent
of streaming technologies like Spotify and Pandora and now, almost
five years later, the consent decree with the DOJ remains in place and
unchanged.153 With an eye to the almost five-year delay, the proof is
in the pudding that modification precedent is too rigid and needs to
be loosened to make it easier to update terms of consent decrees.
If a party to a consent decree—especially if that party is a major
player in a multibillion-dollar industry, like BMI—sees the need to
change the terms of that decree in order to optimize its business in
response to new technologies such as music streaming, then there
needs to be a way for that potential modification to be explored more
efficiently. In addition, the modification process must not be
unilateral, like reinterpretation. Rather, a petition for modification
should involve the courts as an independent decisionmaker and be
handled in an objective and fair manner that gives all parties to the
decree the opportunity to represent their respective interests.
Therefore, modification of consent decrees should follow a process
149. See Kodak, 63 F.3d at 102 (finding appropriate grounds to terminate the consent
decree).
150. See Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 627 (“Yet despite their explicit adoption of Rufo,
both courts imported a requirement not adhered to in Rufo itself . . . .”).
151. See id. (“The extensions of Rufo by the Kodak and Western Electric courts are
therefore somewhat innocuous, representing little more than a Swift/United Shoe analysis
under the guise of Rufo.”).
152. See id. (“Due to Rufo’s generally warm reception beyond the institutional reform
context, uncertainty persists as to whether future courts will apply Rufo literally to
requests to modify antitrust consent decrees.”).
153. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 321.
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similar to litigation but needs to be expedited in order to enable
companies like BMI to make changes necessary for their business to
operate efficiently in the face of technological advancements like
music streaming.
A counterargument here might be that litigation is typically a
slow process that can span a number of years, so if modification
requests are going to proceed through the courts, then one must be
prepared to wait years for a resolution. However, the issue of
modifying antitrust consent decrees that profoundly affect the
operation of a multibillion-dollar industry like performance rights
licensing is a more urgent one than a standard dispute that one might
see in other contexts, such as routine business or employment
litigation. While business litigation is notorious for being a long,
drawn out process, the delay is not as troubling because the dispute at
issue is typically more private in nature as compared to a dispute
surrounding an antitrust consent decree.
For instance, if a business spends years litigating whether an
employee violated his nondisclosure agreement, that is unfortunate
and costly for the parties but typically comes at a minor cost to the
general public and the overarching industry in which the business
operates. On the other hand, litigation surrounding the modification
of a consent decree can affect the operation of an entire industry
directly and, in a less quantifiable sense, can impact the entire
economy when its effects are aggregated. In that sense, antitrust
consent decrees like the one at issue in Broadcast Music, Inc. are
more public in nature than traditional business litigation.
Since the modification of antitrust consent decrees presents a
more urgent question that affects a much wider swath of the
American public than typical private business litigation, there is
greater societal interest in resolving the consent decree dispute
expediently. As such, streamlining litigation in the context of antitrust
consent decrees should be elevated over efforts to expedite routine
forms of litigation, such as business or employment disputes.
Multiyear litigation, which has become standard in American society,
should not be tolerated in a context like proposed modifications to
antitrust consent decrees because of the far-reaching implications for
an industry and the overall economy.
IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGES TO THE BMI CONSENT DECREE
It is important to allow modifications of antitrust consent decrees
because all parties have powerful interests that are profoundly linked
to the terms of the decree. If technologies change in such a way that
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parties find themselves in a materially worse position than at the time
of the original agreement, then intuitive notions of fundamental
fairness and equity would demand that the terms of the decree be
adjusted. Oftentimes, as in the case of Broadcast Music, Inc., both
parties want changes to the current operation of the consent decree.
A. Reasons Why BMI Wants to Change the Consent Decree
BMI wants to update the consent decree so that it clearly permits
fractional licensing for several reasons, all of which are tied to the
advent of digital music. Although fractional licensing is already the
traditional industry practice, BMI wants to update the consent decree
to clarify that fractional licensing is permitted. Under a fractionallicensing regime, “BMI represents only the interests of its writers and
publishers.”154 BMI argues that “[f]ractional licensing . . . is the
efficient, common-sense way to deal with the longstanding fact that
many songs are co-written by BMI affiliates and non-BMI affiliates
(‘split works’).”155 In fact, the ubiquity of split works likely makes a
full-work licensing regime untenable as a practical matter.
BMI also wants publishers to be able “to give BMI the right to
license works for certain uses, while permitting publishers to retain
the exclusive right to license works for other defined, digital uses.”156
BMI wants this change so it can offer easier and more efficient access
to its immense collection for many traditional music uses that have
existed for decades.157 BMI also believes the change would have the
positive effect of providing publishers and music users with the
opportunity to negotiate their own free-market deals in the numerous
new digital contexts, like streaming, that could not have even been
dreamed of when the BMI consent decree was last amended.158 The
newest technology that has most disrupted the performance rights
licensing industry is music streaming.159 Although music streaming is
excellent for consumers, composers claim that they have not been
adequately compensated in the streaming era.160 Streaming services

154. See Public Comment, Broad. Music, Inc., Review of Consent Decree in United
States v. Broad. Music, Inc. 3 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi18.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNY4-447L].
155. Id.
156. What Is the Consent Decree?, supra note 69.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Gagliano, supra note 8, at 318.
160. Id.
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like Apple, Amazon, Google, Pandora, Spotify, and Tidal, however,
disagree with those claims of inadequate compensation.161
Both PROs and songwriters want fractional licensing because
they are concerned that full-work licensing would depress royalty
rates by enabling digital music users like Spotify to shop around for
whichever PRO is offering the lowest price.162 The fear among PROs
and composers is that full-work licensing would lead to a “race-tothe-bottom,” resulting in reduced license rates for PROs and lower
royalties for composers.163 BMI also wants to clarify that it can bundle
any rights relating to the musical work that a music user needs to
bring its product or service to the public.164 By bundling rights, BMI
could be a one-stop licensing source in order to meet the needs and
match the ever-increasing pace of the digital marketplace.165
Next, BMI wants to move the rate-setting forum from federal
court to a binding arbitration model because it would resolve disputes
more quickly and less expensively for all parties.166 Arbitration
procedures have changed significantly since the Supreme Court began
ushering in a new “Age of Arbitration” during the 1980s.167
Consequently, arbitration has become a much more useful tool for
efficient dispute resolution, leading to its widespread adoption in a
range of different contexts.168 Many of these sweeping changes that
have made the arbitration model more attractive have occurred since
the BMI consent decree was last amended in 1994. As a result, BMI
wants to update the consent decree to move the rate-setting court to
binding arbitration in order to best tailor its terms to new
circumstances that have emerged in society since the last
modification.

161. Id. at 318−19.
162. See id. at 341.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 321 n.26.
167. Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, 96 N.C. L. REV. 381, 383 (2018).
168. See id. at 383−84 (“In the 2010s, the Court expanded on its pro-arbitration
jurisprudence and upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts,
even when those clauses were held unconscionable under applicable state law. The Court
also permitted businesses to insert class-action waivers into their arbitration clauses, thus
preventing victims of illegal activity from participating in class-action litigation. The
growing judicial deference to arbitration clauses has provided firms the ability to include
otherwise unenforceable terms in their contracts, which may allow defendants to shorten
statutes of limitations, to limit damages, and to prevent injunctive remedies altogether.”).
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Reasons Why the DOJ Wants to Change the Consent Decree

On the other hand, the DOJ wants 100% full-work licensing
instead of the standard industry practice of fractional licensing.169
Under the 100% full-work licensing regime, BMI’s licenses would
need “to offer users the ability to perform all ‘compositions’ in its
repertory.”170 Under full-work licensing, a BMI licensee would have
the right to perform all co-written songs without permission to
perform those songs from the other PRO or any other nonaffiliated
co-writer or publisher.171 Those on the side of the PROs—songwriters
and artists—feel that a full-work licensing scheme would “inject great
inefficiency and confusion into the pricing, collecting, and distribution
of performance rights royalties.”172 The inefficiency would result from
PROs having to keep track of the proportional co-ownership interests
of every song, even if some co-owners are not affiliated with that
PRO. The lack of a central database containing co-ownership
information for every song would make it especially difficult for
PROs to comply with a full-work licensing regime.
Broadly, the DOJ wants full-work licensing in order to preserve
what it perceives as procompetitive benefits.173 The DOJ believes
that, with full-work licensing, BMI licenses can provide adequate
“protection from unintended copyright infringement liability and
immediate access to the compositions in the organizations’
repertories.”174 The DOJ also argues that fractional licensing hinders
the operation of the market for public performance licensing and
possibly reduces the playing of music as a consequence.175

169. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 13.
170. Id. at 11.
171. See Public Comment, Broad. Music, Inc., supra note 154, at 4.
172. Id. (“It would also have the perverse effect, from an antitrust policy point of view,
of undercutting an individual publisher’s ability to license their catalogs directly to music
users (because the PROs will have already licensed any split works, which now make up a
large portion of most publishers’ catalogs), thereby shoring up and increasing the
bargaining power of the collective licensing organizations. At the same time, mandatory
100% licensing by PROs would encourage opportunistic gamesmanship by any music user
seeking to avoid paying the full value of all the rights it acquires.”).
173. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 13.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 13−14 (“If ASCAP and BMI were permitted to offer fractional licenses,
music users seeking to avoid potential infringement liability would need to meticulously
track song ownership before playing music. As the experience of ASCAP and BMI
themselves shows, this would be no easy task.”).
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Reasons Why Other Interest Groups Want to Change the Consent
Decree

There are additional interest groups affected by the consent
decree that would also like to see changes in its terms. For instance,
some songwriters believe that the consent decree is both “obsolete”
and “outdated.”176 As songwriters have explained, “[r]ules created
more than sixty years ago to govern the collection of America’s
performance royalties for songwriters cannot possibly function in
2014.”177 Songwriters want the terms of the consent decree to be
changed in order to clarify that the terms allow fractional licensing
because “a shift to 100% licensing would severely impact [their]
creative freedom, [their] ability to choose . . . PRO licenses, [their]
music, and, ultimately, [their] livelihood as songwriters.”178 Under
full-work licensing, songwriters would have to collaborate only with
fellow BMI writers in order to ensure they receive the fee to which
they agreed for their work.179 Under a full-work regime, if a BMI
writer collaborated with an artist belonging to a different PRO that
charges a lower fee than BMI, then the BMI writer could be forced to
accept the lower fee offered by the other PRO, even though the BMI
writer had only contracted with BMI.180
A full-work licensing model could also result in a major drain on
songwriters’ income.181 First, full-work licensing could potentially
delay and lower royalty payments if the payments had to flow through
two PROs because two collaborators were affiliated with two
different PROs.182 There would also be a serious pragmatic concern
based on the fact that, under full-work licensing, songwriters would
“have to monitor what [they] are being paid by a PRO [they] have no
relationship with, figure out whether [the PRO] ha[s] missed any of
[their] performances, understand how and when they will pay [them],
determine whether [they] are getting [their] fair shares of bonuses
under the other PRO’s distribution system, and so on.”183
In addition to concerns about songwriters’ income, a full-work
licensing regime would suppress creativity, as songwriters might have
176. Public Comment, Bart Herbison, Exec. Dir., Nashville Songwriters Ass’n Int’l,
Review of ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 2 (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/307686.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7CY-8HQW]
177. Id.
178. Rosen Letter, supra note 77, at 1.
179. See Public Comment, Broad. Music, Inc., supra note 154, at 3.
180. See id.
181. See Rosen Letter, supra note 77, at 1.
182. See Public Comment, Broad. Music, Inc., supra note 154, at 10.
183. See Rosen Letter, supra note 77, at 1.
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to make choices about with whom they collaborate based on which
PRO the other songwriter belongs to rather than musical talent or
personal chemistry. This creative concern is extremely pressing, as
“[t]he creativity and success of any songwriter stems from being able
to work with songwriters of our choosing, regardless of their PRO
affiliation.”184 Further, songwriters worry that
[a]ll of a sudden, [their] individual and careful choice of [a]
collaborator will not be driven by artistic chemistry or
compatibility, but by rules imposed by the government. The
100% licensing model sounds like the government stepping into
the creative process and effectively dictating our collaborators
and our licensing representatives.185
This potential drain on creativity is profoundly troubling. Creativity is
the engine behind the creation of music, and the art of music is the
foundation of the performance rights licensing industry. Although
economics and music have merged to form a massively profitable
industry, the production of good music from an artistic standpoint is a
necessary predicate for the whole industry to run. Since the
production of good music requires creativity, a 100% full-licensing
regime could threaten the entire music industry by curbing creativity
among songwriters.
One potential unintended consequence of full-work licensing
could be that most or all composers decide to join the same PRO in
order to avoid issues relating to collaboration between members of
different PROs. Although unlikely, this would frustrate the DOJ’s
purpose in entering into these consent decrees, cutting against the
very core of antitrust principles by essentially giving one PRO a
monopoly. A shift of all songwriters to one PRO, however, would
require a massive coordinated movement that is unlikely to ever
occur and, even if it did, the DOJ would likely take some type of
action to stop it.
V. A NEW STANDARD FOR ASSESSING REQUESTS FOR
MODIFICATION OF ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES
If a new standard is needed for modification of antitrust consent
decrees, the next step is to explore viable alternatives.

184. Id. at 2.
185. Id.
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A. The Unworkability of Rufo for Antitrust Consent Decree Cases
One possibility would be to import the Rufo standard into
performance rights licensing jurisprudence. But, as David Konczal
and Jed Goldfarb have both argued, applying Rufo in the context of
antitrust consent decrees would mean forgoing many of the important
benefits such decrees provide.186 Konczal argues that a flexible
modification standard like Rufo would negate the public benefits that
arise from the use of consent decrees as a means of settling antitrust
disputes.187 Konczal argues that applying the Rufo standard in the
antitrust context would make it too easy to change the terms and,
therefore, would “increase the uncertainty and risk faced by antitrust
defendants,188 would reduce the incentive of defendants to enter into
consent decrees,189 and would lead to a waste of scarce judicial
resources.”190 At the heart of Konczal’s argument is the notion that
consent decrees need certainty and finality in order to function
properly.
At the same time, however, flexibility is needed so that terms of
consent decrees can be modified in order to adapt to new
technologies and other societal advancements. Flexibility is needed to
level the playing field and should be regarded as fundamental in the
context of modifying consent decrees. Here, circumstances have
evolved to the point that one party is significantly disadvantaged
relative to the other in such a way that was not contemplated at the
time of the original consent decree.
This idea that governmental mandates carrying the force of law
should be updated from time to time in order to best fit the new
circumstances that come with new generations is not a new concept.191
186. See Konczal, supra note 17, at 134; see also Goldfarb, supra note 68, at 627−28.
187. See Konczal, supra note 17, at 134.
188. “Because a liberal modification standard will likely entice the Antitrust Division
to seek modification of existing consent decrees, applying Rufo in this context will reduce
the certainty and risk-avoidance that defendants seek in entering into consent decrees.”
Id.
189. “[A] liberal modification standard may dissuade defendants from entering into
consent decrees because of a fear that the Antitrust Division will continuously attempt to
intensify the restrictions imposed upon the defendants in the original decrees.” Id.
190. Id. “[I]t will encourage defendants and the Antitrust Division to pursue constantly
modification of consent decrees, thereby wasting the time and money of the courts,
defendants, and the Antitrust Division.” Id.
191. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 35, at 392 (“The
question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have
been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a question of such
consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental
principles of every government.”).
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As noted earlier, Thomas Jefferson stated in his famous 1789 letter to
James Madison that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; that
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”192 With that
statement, Jefferson set forth the idea that laws should be revisited at
least every generation to best meet the needs of the living
generation.193 This principle is relevant and applicable to the issue of
modifying antiquated consent decrees in the sense that they should be
tailored to best fit the needs of the digital age. It seems irresponsible
to regulate performance rights licensing in the digital age under terms
that were drafted in 1966 and amended in 1994, when the industry
was almost unrecognizable from what it is today.
B.

The Benefits of a Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis

Ultimately, though, the Rufo standard is not the flexible standard
that is needed in this context.194 Instead, this Recent Development
proposes the following standard for the modification of antitrust
consent decrees: an antitrust consent decree shall be amended only if,
by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the court finds a
reasonable and necessary request for modification that does not
unduly prejudice the other party or run counter to the public interest.
The three major factors to consider in the analysis include the
following: (1) the necessity, or lack thereof, of the modification
request from the standpoint of the movant; (2) achieving a balance
between whether refusing the request for modification would unduly
prejudice the movant and whether granting the request would unduly
prejudice the nonmovant; and (3) whether the policy benefits of the
modification would outweigh the risk of encouraging more
amendment requests by granting the change.
Issues of antitrust consent decree modification can be so varied
and complex that it is unlikely they can be placed neatly into a clear
standard like Rufo, Swift, or United Shoe. As such, the totality-of-thecircumstances reasonableness test and its accompanying framework
of factors would capture the flexibility of the Rufo test by leaving a
considerable amount of discretion for the courts to make decisions on
a case-by-case basis while still imposing safeguards against Konczal’s
concerns about certainty and finality. In this way, the proposed new
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 68 (making the case that the Rufo standard is
not appropriate for the antitrust consent decree context); Konczal, supra note 17 (arguing
that the Rufo standard should not be extended to the context of antitrust decrees).
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standard would occupy a middle ground between the inflexible Swift
and United Shoe standard and the overly flexible Rufo standard.
The first factor—the necessity, or lack thereof, of the proposed
modification for the movant—is a threshold inquiry to deter frivolous
modification requests that would reduce certainty and finality and
waste money and the time of the courts. As such, this should be the
weightiest factor because the court should dismiss the motion if it
does not find it to be necessary from the standpoint of the movant. In
carrying out the analysis, the reviewing court should take a hard look
at the material position of the movant in the context of changed
circumstances, as well as the intent of the movant. If the movant’s
material position appears relatively unchanged from the time of the
original consent decree, then that is a red flag that the amendment
request is not necessary. In addition, if the movant’s intent appears to
be nefarious, such as to drive up legal costs for its opponent, then that
is also reason to dismiss the motion.
Once necessity has been established, factor two is designed to
promote fundamental fairness. Consideration of the first element of
the balance in factor two—whether refusing the request for
modification would unduly prejudice the movant—is designed to
safeguard against undue enrichment of the nonmovant as a result of
changed circumstances since the initial entering of the decree.
Ensuring the requested modification is the result of circumstances
that have changed since the original consent decree will prevent
parties from simply requesting a modification whenever the terms of
the original consent decree did not end up working out as they had
hoped. This factor directs the court to only grant a modification when
it is the result of changed circumstances and when, as a practical
matter, fairness requires the modification. In assessing this factor,
courts should take a hard look at the changed circumstances alleged
by the movant and how they have affected the way the industry
operates. If the court finds that external forces have materially
changed the movant’s position in a way that could be fixed by
granting the modification, then this factor should weigh in favor of
modification. If it is unclear that the proposed modification would
improve the position of the movant without creating a new advantage
for the movant, then this factor should weigh in favor of refusing the
modification as a way to deter frivolous modification requests.
Consideration of the second element of the balance in factor
two—whether granting the request would unduly prejudice the
nonmoving party—is designed to ensure that the proposed
amendment would not benefit the movant to a degree that would
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place them at an advantage relative to the nonmovant. The idea
would be to prevent modification requests from becoming a
commonly used tool to gain a business advantage. Courts should look
at the effects the modifications would have on the relative position of
the parties, with the goal being the balance of fundamental fairness.
The modification would be acceptable if it would improve the
position of the movant, as that would be the point of the modification
in the first place. But the important thing is that the movant’s position
does not become improved past the point of fundamental fairness to a
point where the nonmovant becomes the disadvantaged party. If
granting the request would improve the standing of the moving party
at the expense of the nonmoving party beyond the equilibrium of
fundamental fairness, then this factor should weigh in favor of
rejecting the modification.
The third factor—whether the policy benefits of the modification
would outweigh the risk of encouraging more amendment requests by
granting the change—represents a broad catchall and simply asks the
court to weigh the overall policy implications of the proposed
modification against the negative policy concerns associated with the
general practice of allowing parties to modify consent decrees.195 This
factor is intended to be broad as a way for the court to keep an eye
out for society in the rare case that a proposed modification may pass
the other factors and be equitable among the parties but have
detrimental effects to the industry, the economy, or society as a
whole.
C.

The Unworkability of a Legislative Solution

A wholesale alternative to the judicial standard proposed above
would be to adopt a comprehensive legislative solution that governs
the business of performance rights licensing. In fact, the DOJ has
suggested replacing the consent decree model with a legislative
scheme in the future but recognizes that the consent decree model is
too entrenched to be changed at this time.196 While that alternative
195. For a discussion of these policy implications, see supra notes 191−94 and
accompanying text.
196. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 22 (“The Division recognizes the
incongruity in the oversight over the licensing of performance rights and other copyrights
in compositions and sound recordings and believes that the protections provided by the
consent decrees could be addressed through a legislative solution that brings performance
rights licensing under a similar regulatory umbrella as other rights. The Division
encourages the development of a comprehensive legislative solution that ensures a
competitive marketplace and obviates the need for continued Division oversight of the
PROs.”).
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would remove consent decrees from the equation, it would frustrate
the main rationale behind the use of consent decrees in the first place:
efficiency.197 While the almost five-year delay since BMI’s initial
modification request seems like a long time, the political and
legislative process could potentially take even longer.
First, PROs would need to lobby the necessary lawmakers in
order to gain support, which could take years. In addition, there could
be serious inequities that arise during the lobbying process. For
instance, a wealthy corporation like Spotify might have much more
political influence than a coalition of songwriters. If the interests of
those two groups clashed, companies like Spotify would be better
equipped to pursue change through the legislative process. As a
practical matter, there would be no remedy for that disparity in power
with respect to shaping the eventual laws and regulations. On the
other hand, consent decrees provide for more equal bargaining power
among the involved parties.
Even if a party were to convince enough lawmakers of its
proposed legislation, those lawmakers would still need to wait for the
opportune time to introduce the bill to ensure that it gets passed. That
timeline could be at the mercy of the current partisan makeup in
Congress or many other factors. In that sense, subjecting antitrust
regulation to the political process would only magnify Konczal’s
concerns about certainty and finality.
In addition, replacing antitrust consent decrees with standard
legislation would unavoidably import the pitfalls of party politics,
special interest lobbies, and other imperfections from the political
system into the decision-making process. For instance, lawmakers on
the side of BMI would inevitably need to relinquish some demands as
a compromise in order to get the necessary votes to pass the bill. As a
result, a legislative scheme would take the act of compromising out of
the hands of the parties who are actually involved and instead place
the ability to compromise in the hands of lawmakers who are likely
detached and disinterested in comparison to the actual parties to the
decree.
The political process tends to be more transparent than the
confidential negotiation process through which consent decrees are
born. Intuitively, it seems much more efficient to have the parties who
will be relying upon the decree negotiating its terms in a confidential
setting. Therefore, the parties are most likely to arrive at the fairest
reasonable compromise because they can negotiate based purely on
197. See supra Part I.
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their own material interests, free from external political pressures that
may have little or no basis in the practical operation of the consent
decree.
Furthermore, members of Congress do not have the same
expertise about emerging technologies that are changing the
performance rights licensing landscape.198 In fact, “[e]ven members of
Congress acknowledged their limited ability to keep abreast of
technological developments for the delivery of music” during
meetings with the Nashville Songwriters Association.199 Without such
intimate knowledge of pertinent issues, lawmakers are unlikely to
formulate a fairer solution than a consent decree that is agreed upon
by parties who possess strong familiarity with the industry and have
the incentive to protect their own material interests.
Although songwriters and artists gained some relief through the
legislative process by getting the MMA passed and signed into law, it
was far from a complete and wholesale solution for the problems
afflicting BMI and the performance rights licensing industry.200
Without a doubt, the MMA was a significant victory for rights
holders, as it will hopefully assuage their most pressing concern by
ensuring that they get paid. The consent decrees between the DOJ
and PROs, however, are still in existence and were not rendered
defunct by the legislation. As a result, the discussion surrounding the
modification decrees remains pertinent. Nonetheless, the MMA
serves to show the potential viability of a legislative solution in certain
circumstances.
D. The Federal Trade Commission as a Potential Alternate Forum
Another alternative would be for Congress to turn enforcement
of antitrust consent decrees over to a special division of the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”). Given that agencies usually hold more
expertise than lawmakers, such an alternative could potentially work
if the proper procedures and safeguards were implemented.
Considering the high stakes that come with modifying a consent
decree, especially since they affect how a multibillion-dollar industry
is regulated, it would be concerning to give the FTC unilateral power
to change antitrust consent decrees.201 Nonetheless, a quasi-judicial
model, where both sides have the chance to argue their positions

198.
199.
200.
201.

See Public Comment, Bart Herbison, supra note 176, at 2.
Id.
Singleton, supra note 23.
See supra Section III.A.
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before an independent decisionmaker within the FTC, could
potentially be a viable option.
Even if it is assumed that consent decrees are a better solution
than the legislative process, the current controversy between BMI
and the DOJ indicates the necessity of some level of flexibility with
respect to modifying the terms of a decree. The nature of the industry
is such that changing technologies can demand changes to the consent
decree by entirely transforming the way business is transacted. In the
case of Broadcast Music, Inc., the advent of digital music is the main
technological advancement that has led to calls for change to the
consent decree.
The new standard proposed in this Recent Development
combines the flexibility of Rufo with safeguards against its main
policy concerns. In addition, the flexibility of the Rufo standard is
enhanced by the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and the
inclusion of the broad catchall in the third factor, which gives the
court a license to strike down a modification proposal if it would
result in negative policy consequences such as those contemplated by
Goldfarb and Konczal.
CONCLUSION
In Broadcast Music, Inc., the district court and later the Second
Circuit correctly struck down the DOJ’s attempt to alter the terms of
the BMI consent decree through a proposed reinterpretation. The
court’s decision was proper both as a technical adherence to
precedent and as a normative matter. Nonetheless, involved parties
need another way to make changes to consent decrees in order to
adapt to ever-changing external forces. The DOJ could stop using
antitrust consent decrees to regulate music licensing, but then the
leading alternative would be to regulate through the political process.
The use of consent decrees, however, is better than a legislative
scheme because it increases efficiency and fairness, and it keeps
decisionmakers independent from the political process. As a result,
the best alternative for making necessary changes to consent decrees
is through the process of modification. Unfortunately, the current
body of law with respect to modification is too rigid and does not
allow parties to make the changes necessary to maintain the efficacy
of the consent decree in response to a rapidly changing technological
environment.
In order to make the modification process more flexible and less
arduous while maintaining the safeguards that underlie the current
modification doctrine, courts should use a totality-of-the-
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circumstances test to assess a proposed modification to an antitrust
consent decree. The proposed totality-of-the-circumstances test and
its accompanying factors provides a court with a framework for
assessing the reasonableness and necessity of a proposed modification
while safeguarding against unfairness, frivolous claims, and other
critiques of flexible standards such as the Rufo standard. The
flexibility of the proposed new standard is important because it levels
the playing field in situations in which circumstances have evolved to
the point that one party is severely disadvantaged relative to the
other.
Although this Recent Development focused on antitrust consent
decrees in the context of the performance rights licensing industry,
the new test it sets forth could potentially be extended to the review
of modification requests in other industries that the DOJ regulates
through consent decrees.202 While not all other industries may be as
inextricably linked to changing technologies as the performance rights
licensing business, all industries need to adapt to changing societal
circumstances to some extent. At the very least, having the ability to
make reasonable changes to a consent decree is an advantage for any
industry. Regardless of the industry, there is never a reason to
continue being governed by outdated regulations when there is a
reasonable way to update them.
Scholars have warned that giving too much flexibility in changing
a consent decree can be problematic because it can undermine the
certainty and finality that are required for consent decrees to function
in the regulatory context.203 However, the standard proposed in this
Recent Development has safeguards built into its framework to
protect against those concerns. Although many specific issues facing
other industries may be unique from those facing the performance
rights licensing business, the proposed new standard represents a
broad enough framework for it to be useful in the regulation of other
industries and other contexts, such as institutional reform litigation or
the regulation of prison conditions. As such, the totality-of-thecircumstances test for reviewing requests to modify consent decrees
202. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Eric Lichtblau, Sweeping Federal Review Could Affect
Consent Decrees Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
04/03/us/justice-department-jeff-sessions-baltimore-police.html [https://perma.cc/7AT4VLQ8 (dark archive)] (examining consent decrees in the context of troubled police
departments). See generally Levine, supra note 18 (discussing the modification of consent
decrees in the context of institutional reform litigation).
203. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 68 (making the case that the Rufo standard is
not appropriate for the antitrust-consent-decree context); Konczal, supra note 17 (arguing
that the Rufo standard should not be extended to the context of antitrust decrees).
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could enhance the efficiency and efficacy of many industries that are
regulated by consent decrees and, in turn, contribute to the overall
prosperity of the American economy.
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